Security and Defense Dominate the First 100 Days of the New European Commission

In the United States, the first 100 days serve as a well-known benchmark for assessing the work and success of a new administration. More recently, this concept has gained traction in Europe, with politicians frequently incorporating it into their campaign programs. The European Union is no exception. 

As part of her re-election bid, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen set an ambitious agenda for the college’s first 100 days. The EU's industrial and technological development have lagged behind the United States and China, raising concerns about the competitiveness of the bloc. Meanwhile, the ongoing war on the EU's doorstep has highlighted the bloc’s lack of investment in its own defense capabilities. Von der Leyen has therefore made boosting competitiveness through decarbonisation and security priorities of the new Commission, aiming to better position Europe in this changing geopolitical order

The new Commission took office on December 1, 2024. On Sunday, March 9, von der Leyen held a press conference to mark the milestone and present their achievements thus far. While security and defense were expected to be a priority for the new Commission–partly due to the newly created portfolio of Defence Commissioner tasked with streamlining Europe’s fragmented defense industry and enhancing European defense cooperation–recent developments in transatlantic security relations have put this work center stage. Although the highly anticipated White Paper on Defense won’t be released until March 19, there have been a slew of security announcements during the first 100 days of the new European Commision that have sought to quell unease about the future role of the United States in transatlantic security. 

At the heart of these announcements is the ReArm Europe plan that pledges to mobilize some €800 billion ($873 billion) for defense spending. This would be done through five steps: making the EU’s fiscal rules more flexible, so that member states could increase their national defense budgets; use cohesion funds; raise private capital through the European Investment Bank and the completion of the Savings and Investments Union (formerly known as Capital Markets Union). The rest–€150 billion –will come from EU-sponsored defense loans, which, according to von der Leyen, should be spent within Europe–signaling waning European dependence on foreign (largely American) defense  companies. 

The ReArm Europe plan has already been endorsed by EU leaders during the special European Council meeting on March 6. This represents a major political step for the bloc that only began to strengthen its security posture after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. The key question now is whether this €800 billion will be enough for Europe to provide for its own defense in the event of reduced US engagement in Europe’s security architecture. Several EU member states, such as Germany, have already made decisions to increase their defense budgets amid growing uncertainty over US commitments to transatlantic security. Ultimately, the vast majority of the funding for ReArm Europe comes from member states and is dependent on their commitment to enhancing defense spending. For some countries,particularly the Baltics and Nordics, this shift has been embraced and internalized, for others further from Europe’s eastern edge, this transition remains a harder sell.

However, this is not the first time the EU has successfully demonstrated its capacity for collective action and extraordinary budgetary measures. Its unprecedented support for Ukraine (through the Ukraine Facility) or the off-budget NextGeneration EU instrument in response to the Covid-19 pandemic recovery are key examples. While joint borrowing (also called Eurobonds) for defense projects is not yet on the table, there is growing recognition that EU members need to do this together to achieve the necessary interoperability and economies of scale. All eyes are now on the forthcoming Commission’s White Paper on Defense that is expected to outline further tangible steps, especially concerning funding, ahead of the European Council meeting on March 20-21.  

The speed and scale of these defense initiatives convey a clear message: the EU is stepping up as a genuine security actor. The European Commission appears to be set to play an important role in driving these efforts–much to the chagrin of some member state actors. Moving forward, allies on both sides of the Atlantic must ensure that these EU efforts to bolster defense and achieve equitable burden-sharing reinforce not just European security, but also the strength of the transatlantic alliance.